Britain invaded! (2)

In my previous post, I discussed the difficulties of describing the Roman invasion of Britain in my novel Legatus Legionis regarding the sailing, and where the invasion forces landed. The next problem involved what happened next? According to Cassius Dio, the first major battle involved two legions, and was fought near the mouth of a river that the Celts seemed to think would be an obstacle for the Romans. This river is usually considered to be the Medway, although as far as I am aware, there is no physical evidence for this, other than a shortage of alternative rivers. Dio appears to say that the Celts stayed by and large behind fixed defensive walls, but also says there was a battle that lasted two days, which was somewhat unusual for the times. The Romans started proceeding when some Batavians swam the river and scattered the Celtic horses, while some Romans led by Hosidius Geta crossed, and found themselves in deep trouble with the Celts, so much so that Geta had to personally join the line. Dio implies that Geta was a legatus, but I find that very difficult to believe. If a commander joins the line, it means that either the Roman squad was hopelessly outnumbered, and that should not happen if a legion crossed, unless the battle was going very badly. There are no records of a legion nearly being wiped out, so it had to be a smaller squad. But no commander of a legion is going to abandon his legion and go off on an adventure with a small squad, so I assumed that Geta was a Tribune, at least at the time.

The next problem was that Dio is fairly emphatic that two legions were involved in this battle, and one of them was the Augusta under Vespasian. But Vespasian’s main objective was to secure the alliance on the south coast. The nominal reason for the invasion was to support Cogidumnus as a client king. The whole point of the invasion was to govern it after the military force succeeded, and it was general Roman policy to have locals governing, at least in name. Roman power would have the last word, but it was a lot easier if someone would do what they wanted for them. To me, the guiding principle is that Cogidumnus was allying himself with Rome because Caratacus had effectively declared war on him. If Rome did not support such an ally, why would any other Celtic tribe support Rome? In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I believe Vespasian and the Augusta would ensure Cogidumnus and his domain were safe, and in doing that he may well have had to fight a battle. There is real archaeological evidence for a battle well to the south of the Medway, although the dating is not absolute, and it could have been prior to the Roman invasion. My interpretation was that this southern one was due to Caratacus trying to deal with the southern Celts who had allied themselves to the Romans, and Vespasian had to deal with them. What the other two legions fought was the remains of this badly mauled Celtic force plus reinforcements after they retreated north and set up camp. That has the advantage of being in accord with the proposition that Vespasian had a major battle in these early stages, and all legions were involved. I cannot believe that in a major invasion, one third of the force would be absent and doing nothing.

This brings up the major difference between writing a historical novel and writing a history. In a history you can consider all the options. In a novel, things happen, and there is no “half-happening” and no “either or”. Further, everything has to be self-consistent. Then, after having gone to all this trouble, there remains the interesting story to write, because all that has been set so far is the background.


Britain invaded! (1)

In my previous post, I raised the issue of the difficulties in writing a historically based novel when the history is unclear. The second problem I came up with on my ebook Legionis Legatus was with the invasion of Britain. Again, the volumes of Tacitus’ Annals relevant to the time are missing, and much of what we know comes from archaeological work, and from Cassius Dio, who unfortunately wrote a relatively short section on this about 150 years later. Suetonius dismisses the invasion of Britain as “one campaign and that of little importance.” He then says that Claudius gained the submission without a battle or bloodshed. Suetonius is not known for praising Emperors! Further, four legions were involved, and that means it was not a campaign of little importance, particularly as there is clear evidence, including archaeological evidence from excavations, that a number of battles took place. (A deeper consideration of the issues involved can be found in Graham Webster’s The Roman Invasion of Britain (Routledge, 1999) and Leonard Cottrell’s The Great Invasion (Evans Brothers, 1958).)

So, what do we know as opposed to infer? Unfortunately, not much. The start was interesting in that when it was time to board, the Legio II Augusta refused. Why not is unclear, but options include a fear of falling off the world, or, according to Dio, the omens were not propitious. This shows that neither Vespasian (the Legatus) nor the overall commander, Aulus Plautius, had the necessary control. That would never have happened (and it did not) under the first Gaius Julius Caesar. Had it, a cohort would be selected and a decimation ordered. Instead, we know all Plautius could do was to appeal to Claudius. What happened then is that a lot of time was wasted, which may have actually helped the invasion.

Exactly what happened next is unclear. Claudius himself could not come and order the troops because his appearance was too unimposing. He had an awkward gait, he tended to dribble when excited, and he stuttered hopelessly. So instead he sent a freed slave, Narcissus, to try to get the troops to embark. Our only record of what happened next is from Cassius Dio. Narcissus was almost shouted down but there was a cry of Io Saturnalia, everyone burst out laughing, and Vespasian got his troops to board. Now, that is a challenge to fill in the pieces, but I hope I managed.

Where did the invasion fleet go, in the first instance? The short answer is, nobody knows. From what we do know, there is reasonable evidence that at least one legion landed at Rutupiae (Richborough), which would be the closest port to where they embarked, assuming they embarked at Boulogne, which in turn is not exactly firm, but is probable. There is clear evidence of a Roman camp at Richborough, but it does not follow that it was the site at AD 43. We know the Augusta under Vespasian was sent to support the Atrebates and Verica, so it is reasonable to assume that they set off to a port closer to the south coast, and many suggest Lemanae (Lymphne, no longer a port), where again the Romans established a base, although again this may have been later. That left the Valeria, and I have adopted the proposition that they would land at Dubrae (Dover), which is the third possible useful port on the south east coast. There is surprisingly little evidence of exactly where the first landings were, although the description from Cassius Dio of what happened next supports at least the Richborough landing. What we do know is that the invasion force landed essentially unopposed. The reason for this is probably that the Britons did not have a professional army, and when they decided the Romans were not coming, they all went home. One good reason for doing this is that they were essentially farmers, and they needed to get the crops in. Whatever the reason, the Romans got well established and nothing much happened, at least as far as we know, until they decided to march. The initial marching also appears to have been unopposed, apart from the odd skirmish of the “hit and run” type, until the first major battle occurred. That will be the next post’s topic.

From a military point of view, if the Celts wanted to stop the invasion, they lost two great opportunities. Landing troops would be a slow business, thanks to congestion and the lack of maneuverability of triremes, and those at sea could do little to help those on land. The second option was while they were marching through forest tracks, as was shown in the Teutoberg forest. But neither opportunity was taken. That was also something to note while plotting the novel.

What do you think of Caligulae?

Let me start my first post of 2014 by wishing you all a happy, healthy and prosperous new year. In my last post of 2013, I mentioned my latest ebook, Athene’s Prophecy, and that the main protagonist had to dodge the erratic imperium of the other Gaius Julius Caesar (Caligulae – note he had two feet!). That makes this ebook at least partially a historical novel, and the question then is, how do you portray Caligulae? Before I address that, stop and ask yourself, how would you describe the man?

I think the average response would be to describe him as a mad tyrant who delighted in killing at random and ruling through terror, I have seen him listed amongst the most despicable rulers. Now, pause, and try to describe what you think.

Now, let us be fair. If he were a terrible tyrant, then surely there would be great cheering when he died. That more or less happened when Tiberius died, and Gaius was cheered vigorously when he publicly destroyed the information Tiberius had on various other Romans. They may have cheered a little less vigorously had they known he had made copies and kept those. Nevertheless, when Gaius was assassinated, the crowds became very angry and they demanded the guilty be caught and punished. All evidence is that the general public were angered by Caesar’s assassination. To understand this, it is necessary to recognize that those of senatorial class tended to want a return to the ideals of the Republic, whereas the masses could not care less for the Republic. The Republic was of no value to the masses, and when, in the Republic, people of adequate means and property volunteered for the legions, when they came back they tended to find themselves dispossessed of their property, and the senators the new owners.

The various privileges the senators had in the old Republic allowed them to amass huge wealth, at the expense of the ordinary Roman. These privileges had been taken in part by the first Gaius Julius Caesar, then further by Augustus and Tiberius, because they knew that you could not run a professional army unless the soldiers could look forward to something in retirement. The first Caesar appealed to the masses, and tried to make their life better, and, at the same time, give himself the masses as defence to being isolated by the senators. Caligulae tried to follow the principle of the first Caesar, except that he did not have quite the same ability. The problem for us is that most of our information comes from people of senatorial class, and they were clearly against Caligulae. One popular source of material is Seneca. Now, he would hardly enthuse about Gaius after Gaius’ death, given the Gaius had exiled Seneca for being involved with plotters who were trying to assassinate him. As an aside, is that what a brutal tyrant would do? Not execute those plotting to kill him? Accordingly, Seneca’s complaints cannot be relied on at all. A secondary problem is that the relevant sections of Tacitus’ Annals are missing, and while Tacitus was of senatorial class and probably did not have any love for Caligulae, Tacitus appears to at least attempt to provide a true picture of what happened, even if he does add some personal comments.

So, what to do? Next post I shall explain my solution.